Constitutional Reform Packages

Article II · 3 offices · 9 powers

This package brings Fjordheim's constitution in line with a government that actually has to answer to voters more often. It shortens both election cycles, expands the Nordting so more parties can win real representation, strips the presidency of veto power in favor of a legislature elected twice as often, and moves regulatory and security functions to ministries directly accountable to the public, rather than offices no one voted for and no one can remove. Judicial appointments move to the presidency specifically because that office now sits on a longer, steadier term than the faster-turnover Nordting this same package creates. Every change here trades permanence for accountability. — NOTES BY MEASURE [Constitutional Amendments — cooldown 1 to 5 years] A five-year gap keeps future amendments from becoming a routine political tool, protecting the reforms in this package from being unwound by whichever government follows. [President — loses veto power] A president who can't block legislation the Nordting passes has to win the argument in public, not sit on it in private. [President — no-confidence threshold 67% to 55%] A supermajority this high effectively shields a president from removal in practice. Fifty-five percent keeps the tool real without making it trivial to use. [President — runoff system] No one should hold the presidency on a plurality when most voters chose someone else. A runoff makes sure the winner actually commands majority support. [President — term 16 to 36 months] Aligning the presidency to a steadier three-year term gives it enough continuity to anchor institutions, like judicial appointments, that shouldn't turn over at the same speed as the Nordting. [Nordting — term 75 to 24 months] Already agreed with DLP: a legislature this responsive can't drift far from what voters actually want. [Nordting — seats 35 to 115] More seats mean more parties actually clear the threshold to win represen