On the constitutionality of the Homeschooling Regulation
What is challenged
Homeschooling Regulation
The law today
Homeschooling allowed with curriculum standards, testing, and inspections
The appeal asks for
Homeschooling prohibited; all children must attend licensed schools
- Appellant
- Freedom For Us
- Filed
- May 17, 2023
- Decided
- Aug. 5, 2023
The case
The appellant's argument, then every party's submission, oldest first. Submissions are advisory: the justices read them, they do not count as votes.
Freedom For Us Appellant · May 17, 2023
I. Introduction
This case concerns an apparent conflict between the mandatory education requirement "in public institutions" prescribed in Section 2, Article XXII of our Constitution (hereinafter the "Clause") and the alternative educational framework permitted by the Regulation at issue.
II. Relevant Constitutional and Regulatory Provisions
The Clause mandates that "[p]rimary and secondary education shall be compulsory and provided free of charge in public institutions as prescribed by law."
Conversely, the impugned Regulation stipulates that "[h]omeschooling [is] allowed with curriculum standards, testing, and inspections."
III. Summary of Argument
Because the Clause explicitly mandates education "in public institutions," homeschooling as a substitute for primary and secondary education provided in such institutions evidently conflicts with the constitutional requirement.
It makes no difference that such alternative schooling is subject to regulatory restrictions—such as curriculum standards, testing, and inspections—because these measures do not alter the inherent nature of homeschooling, which remains education taking place in the private sphere.
The Clause contemplates that the State shall provide a uniform education in a shared environment for every child to effectuate the fundamental right to education (Sec. 1, Art. XXII of our Constitution). Permitting homeschooling simply evades this constitutional mandate.
IV. Conclusion
The impugned Regulation must be struck down as unconstitutional.
Respectfully submitted,
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Partido Nacionalista De Belvaria Support · 13 Sep 2026, 9:55 a.m.
Todos los niños merecen una educación de calidad y en casa esa educación no se recibe.
The bench
Each justice's vote and reasoning, published under their seat number. The court never reveals who sits on it.
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Justice #2 Did not vote
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Justice #3 Did not vote
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Justice #4 Uphold
The Appellant has brought forward to the Court the claim that the current Homeschooling Regulation, which permits homeschooling, is unconstitutional due to infringing Article XXII. Specifically, the Appellant is making the case that it infringes on Section 2, which states "Primary and secondary education shall be compulsory and provided free of charge in public institutions as prescribed by law." The Appellant has made the claim that the "public institutions" written in this Article does not encompass homeschooling. Upon further analysis, I concur with this claim as the use of 'public' indicates the oversight of public authorities, with governmental funding, responsibilities and standards placing them in the 'public sphere', that I believe cannot be exerted on private home learning as these would be within the 'private sector'. This distinction is crucial for the validity of home schooling, or even private schooling, as the primary source of the compulsory education mandated by the Constitution, when deciding if the presence and utilisation of these alternatives to 'public' schools have any legal basis. As such, because home schooling falls in the 'private sector', and the fact that the Constitution explicitly calls for education in 'public institutions', I must uphold the Appellant's appeal and find this law unconstitutional.
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Justice #5 Deny
The question presented is whether the Homeschooling Regulation, in its current form (curriculum standards, testing, and inspections), is repugnant to Article XXII, Section 2 of the Constitution, which provides that "[p]rimary and secondary education shall be compulsory and provided free of charge in public institutions as prescribed by law."
The appellant reads this clause as an exclusive channel requirement: that compulsory education may occur only inside a public institution, so that any regulated alternative is per se unconstitutional. That is not the only, or even the more natural, reading of the text. The clause performs two functions: it imposes on the State an affirmative duty to make free public schooling universally available, and it makes the compulsory-education mandate subject to implementation "as prescribed by law." That qualifying phrase is a delegation, not a limitation — it commits the manner of discharging the compulsory-education obligation to the ordinary legislative and regulatory process. Article VI, Section 2(l) confirms that education is a field of ordinary legislative competence, and Article XXII, Section 1 frames education first as a right of the person, not merely a duty to attend a particular type of building. Read together, these provisions are consistent with a regime in which the State guarantees free public schooling for all while permitting a regulated alternative — one bound by state-set curriculum standards, testing, and inspection, as this Regulation is — to satisfy the same compulsory-education mandate. That is a policy choice within the discretion the Constitution leaves to the lawmaking branches, not a constitutional violation.
At minimum, the clause is genuinely ambiguous as between the appellant's exclusive reading and the harmonizing reading set out above. Where the text does not compel one construction, the presumption of constitutionality controls and the policy question belongs to Parliament, not this Court. The pleadings filed in support of the appeal reinforce this: they argue that homeschooling is outdated or pedagogically inferior in a "digital world," which is an argument for the legislature to weigh in choosing among the Regulation's own listed options, not a showing that the Constitution forecloses the option Belvaria has chosen. Nor does the remedy sought — outright prohibition of homeschooling — follow even from the appellant's own premise, since a narrower defect, if one existed, would go to the adequacy of the standards imposed rather than to the mere existence of a regulated alternative.
The appeal is denied. The Homeschooling Regulation remains in force under its current option. -
Justice #6 Did not vote